The workshop explores the interplay between formal methods and trusted hardware, e.g., Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) and Trusted Platform Module (TPMs).

Important dates:
- Paper submission: 5 July
- Notification: 26 July

Submission: https://easychair.org/conferences/?conf=pavetrust2024

  • Eleni Vafeiadi Bila (Arm)

Eleni Vafeiadi Bila joined Arm in August 2023. Since then, she has been contributing on formal verification for Arm CCA. Her work involves using the HOL4 theorem prover to verify various properties of the RMM (Realm Management Monitor) specification.

Before joining Arm, she pursued a PhD at the University of Surrey. Her research has focused on formal methods in the context of persistent memory. This includes persistency semantics, program logics, and verification of persistent software transactional memory algorithms using the Isabelle/HOL theorem prover. Prior to her PhD, she earned a BSc in Computer Science from the University of Piraeus and an MSc in Information Security from UCL.

  • Hannes Tschofenig (University of Applied Sciences Bonn-Rhein-Sieg/Siemens, Germany)

Hannes Tschofenig contributes to global standards to make the Internet more secure. He has been active in the IETF for the past 20 years and contributed to more than 90 RFCs on security, privacy and various Internet protocols. Hannes co-chaired several IETF working groups, including SCITT, OAuth, ACE, KEYPROV, DIME, and ECRIT. From 2010 to 2014 Hannes was a member of the Internet Architecture Board (IAB), a committee of the IETF.

  • Ian Oliver (University of Jyväskylä, Finland)

Ian Oliver is a Professor of Cybersecurity at JYU in Finland specialising in trusted and confidential computing. He has a long background in telecommunications security with Nokia Bell Labs.

  • Jo Van Bulck (KU Leuven, Belgium)

Jo Van Bulck is a postdoctoral researcher in the DistriNet research lab at KU Leuven, Belgium. His research explores microarchitectural security limitations along the hardware-software boundary, with a particular attention for privileged side-channel attacks on trusted execution environments. Jo’s research has uncovered several innovative attack vectors in commodity Intel x86 processors, as well as in low-end IoT platforms.